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PRIVATE INCOME A VERA GING
wealth should not be transferred at death tax free,53 the Treasury's
necessity requirement goes beyond any standard suggested by Congress.
The rejection of the validity of the regulations by Estate of Park issues
a challenge to the Congress aptly stated by Judge Goffe in his dissenting
opinion in Estate of Smith:
If additional safeguards are needed they should come from the
Congress, not from the Secretary or his delegate in the form of unau-
thorized regulations. . . [T]he estate tax must be safeguarded from
unauthorized and unwarranted limitations imposed by regulations as
well as abuses which may occur elsewhere."
ROBERT DEWITT DEARBORN
Income Tax - Triumph of Form Over Substance-Private Income Aver-
aging
Taxpayers have long attempted to avoid the payment of federal
income taxes by transferring their future income to other persons and
having the transferees pay the taxes on the income at a lesser rate. The
Internal Revenue Service and the majority of the cases that have consid-
ered these schemes have disallowed such anticipatory assignments of
income and have assessed taxes against the original recipient of the
income, the assignor, in the years in which the income is received by the
assignee. In the recent case of Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner,'
however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed a taxpayer-
assignor to avoid paying taxes on the income in the later years; the
assignee paid the taxes instead. This avoidance was accomplished by the
taxpayer "selling" his rights to the future income and paying taxes on
the "sale price" in the year of transfer, a maneuver which resulted in a
substantial tax saving for the assignor.
2
This decision is a poor one for two reasons. Specifically, the money
received by the taxpayer from his assignee had more of the characteris-
tics of a loan than payment for the purchase of an asset. If the transfer
of the 122,820 dollars were a loan, there would have been no tax conse-
quences at the time of the assignment of the income, and the income-
"United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 131 (1963).
"57 T.C. at 665.
1472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
21d. at 869-70.
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going to the assignee in the later years would have been viewed simply
as a repayment of the loan upon which the assignor would have been
taxed in those years. A more general criticism is that even if the transfer
were valid sale, the decision not to tax the assignor in later years appears
erroneous in light of other anticipatory assignment cases which have
disallowed such shifting of the incidence of the tax.' As a result of this
apparent break with past cases, the Stranahan decision could mark a
major victory for taxpayers by giving them a tremendously powerful tax
planning tool for averaging expected future income.'
The facts of the case are fairly simple. Stranahan was a cash basis
taxpayer who had made a large payment in 1964 to the Internal Reve-
nue Service pursuant to a closing agreement concerning tax deficiencies
related to several personal trusts. As a result, Stranahan was entitled
to such a large interest deduction in 1964 that it exceeded his income
for the year. He was not eligible to carry his net operating loss forward
or back because section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code5 limits car-
ryovers to businesses losses. In order to retain the benefit of the interest
deduction, he increased his ordinary income for 1964 by "selling" his
rights to future dividends on stock that he owned (but not the stock
itself) to his son and accordingly reported the money received from the
son as taxable ordinary income for 1964.6
According to the agreement reached between Stranahan and his
son, beginning in 1965 the son was to receive all the dividends from
certain stock in Champion Spark Plug Company until the cumulative
amount of dividends paid to the son reached 122,820 dollars, at which
time any further dividend income was to return to Stranahan. 7 The son
paid Stranahan 115,000 dollars for the dividend rights, the present value
of 122,820 dollars of future income, discounted by five per cent, the then
3E.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
'Stranahan was able to reduce his overall taxes by paying the tax on the income in the earlier
year rather than in subsequent years because the "sale" allowed him to take advantage of a large
deduction. Such sale arrangements by taxpayers to take advantage of large deductions will likely
occur so infrequently that they will not likely result in any significant revenue loss to the federal
government. Taxpayers will, however, be able to reduce significantly their taxes by selling future
income and paying taxes in earlier years when they are in lower tax brackets. The taxpayers will
receive the same amount of income but through the "sales" procedure they can spread the income
over several years and thus minimize the effect of the progressive rate structure. Thus Stranahan's
acceleration plan has universal applications.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 172.
1472 F.2d at 868.
7Id.
[Vol. 52
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prevailing interest rate for standard commercial loans. Although no
dividends had been declared at the time of the transfer, the 122,820
dollars was expected to be paid to the son within three years. This
expectation was based on the long history of regular dividend payments
by Champion, 8 a fact known by both parties to the agreement as both
were employees and stockhokders of the firm.9 Pursuant to the agree-
ment Stranahan notified the transfer agents for Champion and directed
them to pay the dividends directly to the son until the 122,820 dollars
was accumulated. 10
In 1965 the son received a total of 40,050 dollars in dividends as a
result of the agreement. He included this amount less his basis in his
ordinary income for that year and paid the taxes on it. Stranahan had
not included this amount in his 1965 income, so the Commissioner filed
a deficiency notice against Stranahan's estate" for the tax on the 40,050
dollars of dividends. The Tax Court held for the Commissioner, relying
on Helvering v. Horst 2 and related cases, finding that the transaction
between Stranahan and his son was "not a bona fide sale" and was
"devoid of any substantive purpose other than tax avoidance.'
' 3
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision14 and
determined that the father-son assignment was a valid arm's-length sale
for sufficient consideration. The court distinguished Stranahan from
Horst which had taxed an assignor of future income, by saying that the
Horst principle referred only to gratuitous assignments of future income
and not to sales for valid consideration.15
LOAN VERSUS SALE
Section 45 1(a) of the Code states the general rule that a cash basis
'Estate of Frank D. Stranahan, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1133, 1136 (1971). Actually the
$122,820 was paid in less time than originally estimated, because Champion raised its dividend rates
in 1965.
Old.
I'Stranahan and his son complied completely with all the formalities of a sale. The purchase
price was actually paid to Stranahan, the son used his own money in the transaction, and the
dividends were paid directly to the son, not through Stranahan. Id. at 1135.
"Stranahan died in November of 1965 so actually the Commissioner assessed the deficiency
against Stranahan's estate for dividends declared between January and November of 1965. Id. at
1135.
12311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1138.
"Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 870.
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taxpayer is to be taxed in the year in which he receives income. 6 Clearly,
however, neither this section nor section 61, the general gross income
provision, considers proceeds from a loan to be taxable income. A loan
in which the proceeds must be repaid by the borrower and a sale of
rights to future income in which the purchase price is paid over a period
of time are similar transactions in appearance, and consequently it is
often difficult to discern the true nature of these transactions. Theoreti-
cally, in a sale all rights of ownership are transferred to the buyer;
whereas in a loan, the lender merely relinquishes possession of the prop-
erty being loaned, not ownership. In practice, however, it is difficult to
determine whether all the rights have been shifted. The key used to
determine whether substantially all the rights of ownership have been
transferred is the allocation of risk associated with the property. In a
sale the buyer assumes the risks attached to the property being sold, but
with a loan arrangement the risk element normally does not change
hands; the status quo is maintained." When no risk-shifting occurs as
in Stranahan, the transfer should be characterized as a loan."
One major indicator that the risk was not transferred from Strana-
han to his son was that the future dividend income was discounted by
the standard five per cent interest factor which would have been applied
to any routine commercial loan. No adjustment was made for an addi-
tional risk factor. There was no substantial danger that Stranahan's son
would not receive the future dividends he had been assigned. Champion
Spark Plug had a long history of profitable operations and dividend
distributions, and there was no indication that this pattern would be
broken in the near future. 0 Because both Stranahan and his son, as large
stockholders in Champion, were in a position to exert influence over
6INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 451(a).
"I1d. § 61(a).
sFor example, if a buyer purchased a horse and the animal died subsequent to the sale, then
the buyer would suffer the loss since death was one of the risks that he assumed. In contrast, if
one borrowed a horse from a friend for breeding purposes and the horse died during the borrowing
period, the borrower would suffer no loss since the risk of death remained with the owner-friend,
assuming, of course, that the borrower was not the cause of death.
"In 1965, in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 574 (1965), the Supreme Court stated
that "risk-shifting ... has not heretofore been considered an essential ingredient of a sale for tax
purposes." Brown was not an ordinary sale case, however, because it concerned a "bootstrap" sale
of a business by a corporation to a charitable institution with the purchase price payable out of
the future earnings of the business. A sale to a charity is a narrow area of the law involving special
considerations such as the tax exempt status of these institutions and their lack of capital available
for investment. These factors were not present in Stranahan.
2OSee note 8 supra and note 21 infra.
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corporate dividend policy, the chance that the dividend payments would
cease within the three years needed to pay off the 122,820 dollars was
negligible.
21
The risk question presented in the Stranahan case is relatively novel
because most cases considering prior assignment of future income were
either clearly gratuitous assignments22 or sales, 3 and the loan versus
sale problem never arose. One recently decided case, J. A. Martin,
4
however, did involve this risk question because, like Stranahan, it con-
cerned an attempted acceleration of income. In Martin, the cash basis
taxpayer had suffered a large personal loss in 1966. In order to obtain
the full benefit of the deduction, he assigned future rental income from
an apartment house in return for 225,000 dollars in 1966. The assignee
of the future income was to receive the rent until he received 225,000
dollars plus a seven percent "supplemental sum." The taxpayer made
no guarantee that the 225,000 dollars would be repaid, but he did agree
to keep the apartment operating for two full years following the assign-
ment." The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit found the transaction to
be merely a loan and taxed the taxpayer not in 1966, but in 1967 when
the actual rents were paid. The court said, "[ain anticipatory assign-
ment, such as this, no matter how ingeniously and elegantly contrived,
is not to be disposed of by attenuated subtleties. We conclude that the
transaction instigated by J. A. Martin was purely and simply a'device
to avoid the proper taxation of the petitioners.
'27
The Sixth Circuit in Stranahan distinguished the result in Martin
on the fact that the borrower in Martin had guaranteed to keep the
business operating, whereas Stranahan had made no such warranty.28
"In 1963, 64% of the stock of Champion Spark Plug Co. was owned by and for the Stranahan
family and by the directors of the corporation, and both Stranahan and his son were directors.
MooDY's MANUAL 945 (F. St. Clair ed. 1963). Moody's Manual for 1964 only states that a
majority of the stock was owned by and for the Stranahan family and by the directors. Three of
the seven directors were members of the Stranahan family. MOODY's MANUAL 1506 (F. St. Clair
ed. 1964). The dividend rights from the 26,700 shares of stock in the transaction between Stranahan
and his son, however, represented only approximately one-half of one per cent of the shares of
Champion then outstanding.
"See cases cited notes 39-41 infra.
13See cases cited note 48 infra.
2156 T.C. 1255 (1971), affd mer., 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973).




21472 F.2d at 871.
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This seems a specious distinction since there was little doubt that Cham-
pion would remain in operation for at least three years. The continua-
tion of corporate operations was simply assumed, and neither Strana-
han nor his son felt the need to insert a continuation clause into their
agreement. Furthermore, unlike the taxpayer in Martin, Stranahan
dealt with a relative, making the transaction look even more like a loan
instead of an arm's-length sale. Thus it seems very difficult to distin-
guish the facts of Martin from those of Stranahan; both clearly appear
to be transfers of money with repayment practically assured in the
future, the assignee effectively accepting no risk.
The right to income from future stock dividends is recognized
under Ohio law as a property right apart from ownership in the corpora-
tion which the stock represents.29 An assignment of future dividend
rights might be deemed a sale of an asset, particularly when the rights
transferred are the rights to all future income, rather than income for a
limited number of years." Over a long period of time there is a substan-
tial risk that the dividends would increase or decrease. On the other
hand, a three-year assignment of future dividends in a financially secure
corporation is not likely to involve any major risk of lost dividends.',
Furthermore, even if Stranahan's assignment were a valid sale of
property under state law, formal compliance with local property law is
not always binding in tax matters. Gregory v. Helvering2 long ago
established the principle that, while "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether
avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted,"33
the form of a transaction does not control over its substance.34 The
Gregory reasoning is not isolated dicta; many other courts have stressed
that the substance of a transaction controls over the form35 and have
"Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 1,44 (Com. Pleas Ct. 1910), affd, 88 Ohio St. 603,
106 N.E. 1065 (1913) (mem.).
'lt is likely that the transfer would not have to be of all dividend rights; an assignment of
income for thirty or forty years could also be considered a piece of property. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(a)-I(c) (1956), where a thirty-year lease is deemed the equivalent of a fee. A transfer of
a twenty-year lease, however, did not qualify as an assignment of property. Gait v. Commissioner,
216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). See also cases cited note 42 infra.
3'Moreover, Stranahan and his son were in a position to exert control over Champion's
dividend policy. See note 21 supra.
32293 U.S. 465 (1935).
11Id. at 469.
3Id. at 470.
21The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945), said,
"[t]o permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely
[Vol. 52
PRIVATE INCOME AVERAGING
consequently freely delved into the underlying motives of transac-
tions.6 Thus the Sixth Circuit was not compelled to find that the
assignment in Stranahan was a sale simply because it conformed to a
sale of "property" under state law.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
The prior discussion of Stranahan was concerned with the particu-
lar facts of the case and the wisdom of the determination that the
assignment was a sale rather than a loan. The effects of the Stranahan
decision, however, will not be limited to the specific facts of the case,
for it will likely have far reaching consequences, touching several areas
of the tax law.
Two lines of cases considering assignment of future income are
relevant to Stranahan-those cases in which the assignor transferred
rights to future income for no consideration or clearly inadequate con-
sideration, 37 and those cases in which the assignor sold for adequate
consideration rights to future income and tried unsuccessfully to get
capital gains treatment for the sale.38 Where the assignor has made a
gift of the future income, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl,39 Blair
v. Commissioner," Helvering v. Horst,41 and related cases, has estab-
lished certain basic principles. When the donor gives away only the
rights to future income he will be taxed on that income in the year the
donee receives the earnings; 42 when the donor gives away the property
which will produce the future income as well as the rights to the future
earnings, then the donor will not be taxed on the income. 3 The Court's
to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress." In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334-35 (1940), the Court similarly held that,
"[t]echnical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts and conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia
which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic
issue. . .And . . .devices which, though valid under state law, are not conclusive so far as § 22
(a) is concerned." See also B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14, at 99 (3d ed. 1971), for a discussion of the meaning of Gregory.
31E.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). Knetsch is analogous to Stranahan
since the Court in that case disallowed a scheme by the taxpayer to accelerate his interest deduc-
tions because the plan lacked a substantive purpose.
"See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
'sSee notes 47-48 and accompanying text infra.
39281 U.S. Ill (1930).
40300 U.S. 5 (1937).
41311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"2Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118-19
(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11, 115 (1930).
3Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13-14 (1937). In Blair the taxpayer assigned his entire
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reasoning is that the donor receives "satisfaction" income for his gift,
and accordingly he is taxed on the satisfaction obtained.4
Stranahan as assignor agreed that he should be taxed but con-
tended that he should be taxed in the year of the transfer (1964), rather
than in the years the assignee was to receive the income (1965-67) In
the gift cases, the courts have taxed the donor-taxpayer in the years in
which the donees received the transferred income, not in the year of the
transfer.45 Stranahan, however, was not a gift case; rather the transac-
tion in it was deemed a "sale" by the court, with the transferor receiving
payment in the year of transfer. One of the pervading principles which
underlies the Internal Revenue Code is that the taxpayer should be
taxed at the time he has the ability to pay, which is when he has the
cash income in his possession. 6 This principle provides a logical reason
for taxing Stranahan in the year of the transfer, although the donors as
in Helvering v. Eubank" were not taxed until the income was actually
paid. Since the donor receives nothing for his gift, his ability to pay
taxes on the income is not enhanced in the transfer year.
There have been numerous cases prior to Stranahan,s involving
life estate in a trust and the Court held that this was a transfer of property, relieving the assignor
of the tax burden. In Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), however, the assignor was not
relieved of the tax burden where she assigned a specific amount of trust income for only one year.
The Court thus found that the income interest was not for a sufficient length of time to be converted
to property.
"In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the assignor detached several interest coupons
from bonds he owned and gave the coupons, but not the bonds themselves, to his son. The Court,
in finding the assignor taxable on the interest income received by his son, said:
Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction
which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or property, would seem to be
the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the
corner grocery, the payment of his debt there, . . . or a gift to his favorite son. Even
though he never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposition of
the coupons . . . . The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of
his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he
[taxpayer] had collected the interest in dollars and expended them for any of the pur-
poses named.
Id. at 117.
"Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas
v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1 CUm. BULL. 22; see Lyon & Eustice,
Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 295,
353-56 (1962).
"Cohen, Permissible Reserves and Deferment of Income in Tax Accounting, U. So. CAL. 1957
TAX INST. 329, 334.
47311 U.S. 122 (1940). In this discussion it is assumed that the assignor has not assigned the
income producing property also.
"E.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313
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sales of assets or rights related to future income in which the taxpayer
has been taxed normally in the year of the transfer,49 which was Strana-
han's objective. Although in many of these cases the year in which the
tax should be levied was not in issue, the courts and commentators have
generally reasoned that the need for a parallel with the gift cases, in
which the donor was taxed in the later years, must yield to the ability
to pay principle." Stranahan differs from these sale cases, however,
because in those cases the taxpayers had purposes other than tax avoid-
ance.51 In contrast, Stranahan's sole purpose in making the assignment
to his son was to reduce his tax liability.52 The courts have long required
a transaction to have a valid business purpose before it will be effective
for tax purposes.53 Since Stranahan failed to meet this requirement,
there is a strong reason for not allowing him to be taxed in the year of
the transfer, a reason which probably is superior to the ability to pay
principle in light of the many exceptions in the Code to this cash basis
standard.54
Since section 172 allows carryforwards and carrybacks of net oper-
U.S. 28 (1941); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 866 (1953).
"In each of these cases, the taxpayer had tried unsuccessfully to get capital gains treatment
for the transfer, by labeling the right to future income a capital asset. The courts viewed the
consideration for the assignment as a mere substitute for the ordinary income the taxpayer would
have received if the sale had not occurred. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265
(1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner,
205 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1953).
"E. Blakeney Gleason, II P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1477 (1942); Zarkey, Capital Gain Concepts,
U. So. CAL. 1959 TAX IN sT. 357, 370; Income: Whose, When, and What Kind: A Panel Discussion,
N.Y.U. 24th INST. ON FED. TAX., 1319, 1324 (1966); Note, The P. G. Lake Guides to Ordinary
Income, 14 STAN. L. REV. 551, 562 (1962). In Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.
1956), the court taxed the taxpayer when the transferee received the income, but the court consid-
ered the transaction more of a loan than a sale.
"For example, in Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), the tenant who leased the
taxpayer's building had demanded release from his lease which still had nine years to run. In
contrast, in Stranahan it was admitted that the only objective of the assignment was to reduce
Stranahan's taxes. 472 F.2d at 869. The father did not need the $115,000 to pay the interest on his
closing agreement concerning the private trusts. Id. 869 n.4. Nor was there an assertion that the
son had idle funds and needed a good five per cent investment.
"See note 51 supra. There are, of course, tax considerations in almost every transaction, but
this discussion refers only to those transactions in which tax avoidance is the sole purpose.
13 Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1932); Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292,
296 (5th Cir. 1962); J. A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1255, 1260 (1971). See also notes 32-34 and accompany-
ing text supra.
5"E.g., § 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits deductions for estimated bad debts,
§ 446 permits taxpayers to use the accrual method if it fairly reflects their income, § 456 permits
taxpayers who receive prepaid dues to spread the income over the period of the liability.
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ating losses for only business losses,5 Stranahan could not qualify for
any carryovers since his loss was caused by a large payment of nonbusi-
ness interest. Statutorily he was allowed to take the interest deduction
in 1964, a year in which he would not get the full benefit of the deduc-
tion. However, he was able to benefit fully from his nonbusiness interest
deduction under a scheme for which Congress had made no provision."
Thus the sale by Stranahan had no purpose other than the circumven-
tion of the unambiguous language of section 172. On many occasions
the courts have stated that they will not allow the taxpayer to avoid the
intent of Congress by some artful dodge. Consequently, since the
transaction in Stranahan appears to be a sale only in form but not in
substance, since the transaction lacked a business purpose, and since it
intentionally contradicted section 172, a strong presumption arises
against allowing Stranahan to be taxed in the year of the transfer despite
the ability to pay doctrine." The closest case factually, Martin, certainly
reached this result.
Conclusion
The danger of the Stranahan decision extends beyond the context
of the case because relatively few taxpayers will need to accelerate
income to cover as large a personal deduction as Stranahan. The case,
however, could become a major tax avoidance tool because it seemingly
will permit taxpayers to execute private income averaging schemes
OINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 172.
56The latest indication of Congress' intent toward acceleration of income is revealed by the
case of Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) and its aftermath. In Lake the
taxpayer corporation, in order to cancel a debt of $600,000, assigned the creditor oil payment rights
payable out of the profits earned on oil leases owned by the corporation. The Lake court treated
the assignment as a sale and included the $600,000 in the taxpayer's income in the year of transfer,
taxable, however, at ordinary rates. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 503(a),
68A Stat. 207, Congress added § 636 of the Internal Revenue Code, which treats all such assign-
ments of oil payment rights as mortgage loans rather than sales; now there is no tax effect in the
year of sale and the assignor is taxed in subsequent years on the income assigned. It does not seem
logical that Congress would want to disallow accelerations of oil income rights but allow similar
accelerations of dividend income.
5 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), Helvering v. Gregory, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
0One other distinguishing characteristic between Stranahan and the "pseudo-capital gains"
cases is that in most of the latter group the assignor was transferring more than just three years of
income. It normally was either all the income the taxpayer owned or the income covered larger




apart from the averaging scheme provided in the Code.59 For example,
a twenty-seven-year-old intern, anticipating that his peak income-
producing years would be between his fortieth and fiftieth birthdays,
could arrange to "sell" some of his expected income to a trusting indi-
vidual, receive a yearly payment for the next five or six years, and report
the consideration received as income in the years it was received. Since
he is presently an intern in a comparatively low income bracket for the
next few years, the taxes on these annual payments would be much less
than the taxes would be in later years when he has moved to a higher
bracket. The young doctor could save the consideration he received until
he reaches forty and be in exactly the same economic position as if he
were then earning the income, yet his overall tax liabilities would be
much less. Since Congress has established a comprehensive income av-
eraging scheme, 0 it is highly unlikely that it intended to leave room for
any private averaging schemes such as the one hypothesized. This
loop4hole may be available, however, after Stranahan.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.
Property Law-North Carolina's Marketable Title Act-Will the
Exceptions Swallow the Rule?
Shouts of jubilation from weary title examiners resounded through
dusty deed vaults in courthouses across North Carolina as news spread
of the enactment of a marketable title act' that would reduce the length
of title searches to thirty years. Initial joy was supplanted by disappoint-
ment, however, when a reading of the act, effective October 1, 1973,
revealed thirteen exceptions to the thirty year limitation.
2
Marketable title acts have evolved in answer to the major short-
coming of the recording system. When the common law maxim of "first
in time, first in right" yielded to the concept that he who first records
an interest in real property gains primacy over a subsequent recorder
of that interest 3 a title recordation system arose that preserved indefi-
5"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05.
Cold.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 47B (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
2Id. § 47B-3 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
'Payne, The Alabama Law Institute's Land Title Acts Project: Part I, 24 ALA. L. REV. 175,
181 (1971).
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